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Wilke: Christiane Wilke on Global Justice or Global Revenge

Global Justice or Global Revenge? International Criminal Justice at the Crossroads by Hans Köchler. New
York: Springer, 2003.

In Global Justice or Global Revenge, Hans Köchler aims to analyze the project of international
criminal justice from legal, philosophical, and political perspectives. Köchler is a co-founder and
current President of the Vienna-based International Progress Organization. The book is largely
based on his work for this organization, as the many references to the organization's reports attest
to. The three parts of the book survey international criminal justice, the theory and practice of
humanitarian interventions, and the potential role of the United Nations in fighting terrorism.
The main part of Köchler's book provides a broad overview of the developments of international
criminal justice and universal jurisdiction interspersed with his own theoretical assessments. For
Köchler, the practices of international politics with an emphasis on power are the prime obstacles
to international criminal justice. Institutions of international criminal justice therefore need to be
shielded from international power politics. Köchler would like to see an international equivalent
to the domestic rule of law and separation of powers instead of the diagnosed dependence of
international courts on political power.
Köchler's assessment of international criminal justice reveals a highly reductive understanding of
international law and international politics: "power politics" are complex results of different
actors' interests and identities. Moreover, the legitimacy of law on the domestic level cannot be
secured by banishing politics from lawmaking. Instead, domestic criminal law needs the
legitimacy that only a democratic political process can confer. Why should international criminal
law be able to garner legitimacy without the backing of a democratic and therefore political
process of lawmaking? Köchler seems to assume that law's legitimacy springs from its contents
alone. In fact, he posits that human rights form the indisputable "basic norm" of international
law.
Once human rights are presumed to be the Kelsenian "basic norm" of international law, state
sovereignty and democratic processes are relegated to the status of second-order norms. But what
are human rights precisely? Why should they always prevail over state sovereignty? How can
human rights be reliably grounded in a pluralistic world without a democratic process? Would
the primacy of human rights over state sovereignty entail a broad mandate for humanitarian
intervention? Köchler does not address the theoretical questions that arise from his choice of
declaring human rights the singular basic norm of international law.
Human rights have a complicated relationship to the practice of humanitarian intervention. The
interventions of the 1990s that Köchler criticizes for their neo-colonial aspirations were largely
based on the rhetoric of human rights and the alleged mandate to protect vulnerable populations
in faraway countries from their repressive governments. A theory of international justice that is
simultaneously critical of humanitarian interventions and favors human rights as the basic norm
needs to provide grounds for adjudicating the reach of human rights norms when they conflict
with assertions of state sovereignty. Köchler's book does not engage in a nuanced discussion of
the limits of human rights as a basic norm of international law.
A further weakness of the volume arises from the asserted dichotomy between law and politics.
Köchler reduces politics to "power politics," neglecting that democratic politics are needed for
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making and implementing law. Law simply cannot do without political power, and it is no
stranger to political conflicts. But whenever Köchler detects politics in international criminal
law, he suspects that politics corrupts justice. For him, law's dependence on politics is a liability.
As a consequence, Köchler is critical of practices of international criminal justice that are tied to
political struggles. For example, he distinguishes genuine "victims of atrocities" from those who
merely have "political grievances." To Köchler, the repeated attempts to bring Augusto Pinochet
to trial appear as results of "political strife in Chile resulting from the coup d'état against the
government of Salvador Allende" (97). This judgment illustrates that Köchler's strict division
between law and politics is not only theoretically unsatisfactory but practically pernicious as it
leads to an unwillingness to recognize that crimes against humanity committed with a political
purpose are no less crimes against humanity. On the contrary, organized violence is usually
connected to political projects and therefore needs to be understood as a political and legal
phenomenon.
The strength of Köchler's book lies not in the promised "philosophical reflections on the
principles of international legal order" but in its analysis of less well-known cases of
international criminal justice. For example, Köchler uses his experience as an observer at the
Hague trial of the Lockerbie bombing suspects for insights into the mechanisms and limits of
international criminal justice. The book's strengths in presenting neglected cases and unorthodox
viewpoints are at times outweighed by the predictable costs of this approach. Köchler's
arguments have the habit of sidestepping rather than engaging with the established literature in
the field. One would wish that uncommon arguments were accompanied by more discussion than
merely references to Köchler's own prior writings.
Köchler rightly points out that we need a better understanding of the philosophical, legal, and
political aspects of international criminal justice. Yet his own account is too rigid and insensitive
to the mutual interdependence of international law and politics to provide a compelling critique
and illuminate the next steps of the project of international criminal justice.
Global Justice or Global Revenge is a survey of international criminal justice with a theoretical
argument. However, the lack of theoretical nuance renders this book an unsatisfactory addition
for those who are more familiar with the broader literature on international criminal justice.
Furthermore, its lack of attention to the debates in the field and its technical style make it a
problematic choice as an introductory book.
Christiane Wilke, Carleton University
May 2006
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